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Abstract 
China’s economic and diplomatic ascendancy over the past decade has been nothing short 
of phenomenal in terms of world history. It has seen its influence on the world stage grow 
from being a bit part player at the start of the 20
th century, when its territory sovereignty 
was encroached upon by the European colonial powers and Japan mounted a campaign of 
conquest, to being seen as the biggest strategic threat to American primacy in the global 
economy. This view of China as an economic threat has been reiterated recently by various 
key figures in the United States administration, with calls for a revaluation of China’s 
currency in light of the huge trade deficit the United States has with China. The United 
States acted on both trade and financial fronts in order to urge Beijing to revalue; in the 
former, with the implementation of restrictive quotas on certain categories of textiles and 
garments, and heavy anti-dumping duties on Chinese made TV sets, shoes, furniture and 
socks, and in the latter with former Treasury Secretary John Snow and former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan repeatedly urging Beijing to revalue or move to a 
flexible exchange rate regime.  
Although this paper will focus to an extent on the debate about China’s valuation of its 
currency and its effects on the global economic imbalance, it is the aim of this author to 
attempt an examination of the role the Chinese currency has played in the recent past, its 
current effect on the global economy and the potential impacts it will have on financial 
markets in the future. 
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China’s economic and diplomatic ascendancy over the past decade has been nothing 
short of phenomenal in terms of world history. It has seen its influence on the world 
stage grow from being a bit part player at the start of the 20
th century, when its 
territory sovereignty was encroached upon by the European colonial powers and 
Japan mounted a campaign of conquest, to being seen as the biggest strategic threat to 
American primacy in the global economy. This view of China as an economic threat 
has been reiterated recently by various key figures in the American administration, 
with calls for a revaluation of China’s currency in light of the huge trade deficit the 
United States has with China. The United States acted on both trade and financial 
fronts in order to urge Beijing to revalue
1; in the former, with the implementation of 
restrictive quotas on certain categories of textiles and garments, and heavy anti-
dumping duties on Chinese made TV sets, shoes, furniture and socks, and in the latter 
with former Treasury Secretary John Snow and former Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan repeatedly urging Beijing to revalue or move to a flexible exchange 
rate regime.  
 
Although this paper will focus to an extent on the debate about China’s valuation of 
its currency and its effects on the global economic imbalance, it is the aim of this 
author to attempt an examination of the role the Chinese currency has played in the 
recent past, its current effect on the global economy and the potential impacts it will 
have on financial markets in the future. 
 
The Chinese currency- a primer and a short historical perspective 
The Renminbi (RMB) is the official currency of Mainland China, its title, which 
translates into ‘the people’s currency’, reflects China’s socialist roots and it has been 
in circulation in its current form since the 1
st of March 1955. Politically speaking 
however, China has three currencies, the RMB
2, the Hong Kong dollar and the Macau 
                                                 
1 China’s Role in the Current Global Economic Imbalance, Li-Gang Liu, Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, Tokyo, Japan, March 2005 
2 The RMB is measured in units of Yuan, and both terms will be used interchangeably in this paper  
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pacata. Today the RMB is valued at 7.86 RMB to the US dollar (USD) and Chinese 
foreign reserves stand at almost 1 trillion US dollars (USD)
3.  
 
At the formation of the modern People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese 
currency like many other post-war currencies was virtually unconvertible. China’s 
economic and political isolation from the 1950s to the 1970s also blocked out most 
world trade, eliminating the need for foreign exchange mechanisms. Only the Bank of 
China, the Chinese central bank, had the authority to deal in foreign exchange. With 
the opening up of China’s economy in 1978, the need for easier access to foreign 
exchange lead to more than 3800 authorised foreign exchange institutions by the year 
2004. However throughout this period and until today China still maintains tight 
control on capital flows and the exchange rate.  
 
The Dual Exchange Rate 
One of the interesting aspects that arose with the Chinese exchange rate during this 
period of China’s re-emergence and re-integration with the global economy was the 
existence of a dual exchange rate within the country
4. An internal settlement rate of 
2.80 existed for exporters while the official rate was maintained at 1.50. This dual 
exchange rate system effectively subsidised exports since it increased the profitability 
of Chinese exports, while actually forcing the government to absorb the foreign 
exchange losses.  
 
Outcry from China’s trading partners, notably from the United States, which filed 
several cases against the non-competitive disadvantages of the dual exchange rate, 
and international pressure from the IMF caused a rethink of the system on China’s 
part. At that point anyway the costs of earning a USD in exports were already 
reaching 3.07 RMB and the Chinese government decided to unify the exchange rate 
by abolishing the dual system and revaluing at 2.80 RMB in 1985. What is important 
to note is that during this period of dual exchange rates, the Chinese government took 
active steps to revalue the official RMB rate so that it would reflect a more ‘market 
realistic’ valuation of 2.80 RMB.  
                                                 
3 Emerging Market Indicators, The Economist 25
th November 2006 
4 Is the Chinese Currency Undervalued?, Jiawen Yang & Isabelle Bajeux-Besnainou International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 2, 2006  
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Unification and Re-emergence of a Dual Exchange Rate 
The Chinese government then liberalised further by allowing local (exporting) firms 
to retain their foreign exchange earnings and allowing the Bank of China to create 
local currency swap markets in Shanghai and other major cities in 1980. These swap 
markets created foreign currency demand from firms previously denied access and 
with price flexibility in the swaps market, it was an effective way to sound out a 
market driven exchange rate.  Although this in effect led to a second dual currency 
system, it allowed the Chinese government to effectively gauge market sentiment on 
exchange rates and it subsequently devalued accordingly. This demonstrated 
pragmatic and prudential financial management by the Chinese government in an 
effort to determine the market rate of its currency and this theme of prudential 
financial management will be an important one when considering the role of the 
Chinese currency in global financial markets. 
 
With that being said, it should be noted that even in spite of having an effective 
system to monitor exchange rates, the Bank of China did not revalue fast enough to 
match the swap rates. Perhaps it was over-cautiousness on its part but it eventually 
lead to a price mismatch of up to a 50% premium between swap and official rates. 
With this continued loss of export income, China then chose to reform its foreign 
exchange system in 1994 by adopting a market based, managed floating exchange rate 
system. The dual exchange rates were merged at 8.7 RMB, which was more in line 
with the swap rate. China’s first foreign exchange trading centre was opened in 
Shanghai in April 1994 and this led to its inter-bank foreign exchange market 
developing. This devaluation in 1994 also coincided with an increased growth in 
exports during the 1994-1995 period. This observation led to several commentators 
seeing China’s devaluation and subsequent export growth as one of the causes of the 
Asian financial crisis
5. If this were true, it could be seen as an indicator of the RMB’s 





                                                 
5 The Financial Times (17 September, 1997, p29), The Washington Post (27 November, 1997, pB11),  
The Economist (22 November 1997, p41), Euromoney (December 1997, p38)  
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The Asian Financial Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis began in 1997 when Thailand was forced to devalue its 
currency when it exhausted its foreign currency reserves in an effort to defend its 
currency peg from speculators and investors keen to ‘cash out’. The transition from a 
pegged currency to a free floating one caused the Thai baht to lose half its value
6. As 
investor confidence collapsed throughout Asia, Indonesia, South Korea, the 
Philippines and Malaysia were all affected and their currencies devalued significantly. 
Many factors were cited as causes to the Asian financial crisis, it is generally accepted 
that the increase in interest rates in the United States made the USD more attractive to 
short term investors. This lead to an outflow of capital from the affected countries as 
international investors preferred US investments. This outflow, coupled with 
slowdown in exports severely affected these economies’ current account balance and 
lead to devaluation. With local business and financial sector borrowing heavily 
denominated in US dollars, devaluation and the lack of short-term capital (which had 
fled to the United States) led to a credit squeeze in the affected countries, which 
plunged many of them into recession. Other factors have also been highlighted as 
causes to the crisis, these include; herd mentality by currency traders and an 
accusation by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed accusing George 
Soros
7, a currency speculator, of ruining the Malaysian economy with extensive 
currency speculation. 
 
The underlying reasons for capital outflow and export slowdown merit examination as 
well. It has been argued by a well-known economist, Joseph Stiglitz
8, that the capital 
and financial markets in those countries were not sufficiently developed to deal with 
the influx of speculative capital that entered these economies in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and the subsequent capital flight resembled a bank run after a risk shock. 
This argument in itself is an interesting one in relation to the Chinese currency as the 
                                                 
6 The Thai baht was pegged at 25 Baht to the US dollar and devalued to 56 Baht to the US dollar on 2
nd 
July 1997 
7 Soros has also been implicated in Britain’s exit from the European Monetary Union, where he was 
alleged to have made £2 billion pounds overnight speculating against the British pound in 1992 
8 In his book, Globalisation and Its Discontents, Stiglitz also blames the IMF for fast tracking financial 
liberalisation in these countries, leaving them unprepared, and further exacerbating the Asian financial 
crisis by enforcing ‘Structural Adjustment Packages’ that contravened conventional Keynesian macro-
economic theories. The motives of this were further explored in his next book, The Roaring Nineties.  
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Chinese government has capital controls in place to prevent an event such as this. 
This issue of convertibility and capital controls will be dealt with later in the paper. 
 
China’s Role in Causing the Crisis 
The second causal factor, the slowdown in exports, was attributed to a competitive 
advantage that the Chinese economy had gained due to its devaluation in 1994. This 
led to an upsurge of Chinese exports from 1994 onwards and a subsequent loss of 
competitiveness in the East Asian economies. This argument was countered with the 
contention 
9that although the official rate of depreciation was 20%, with the existence 
of the dual currency regime, the nominal depreciation was in the region of 7% thus 
the focus on 1994 got the timing wrong. However this does not essentially mean that 
the Chinese currency’s devaluation did not affect the East Asian crisis, rather the real 
depreciation of the Chinese currency prior to 1994, when the Bank of China was 




10 to the argument that the RMB’s devaluation was a cause of the 
Asian financial crisis was a study that showed that China’s export growth was 
strongly positively correlated with the rest of Asia’s export growth and thus export 
competition from China would have minimal effects on other East Asian exports. 
However it was noted in the study that in the early 1990s exports from China grew 
10% faster than the rest of developing Asian and in the first nine months of 1997, 
exports grew 11% faster. Although it may be hard to precisely define the impact that 
Chinese export competition had on developing Asia, it would be absurd to say there 
was no competition. Therefore with that in mind it can be said that China’s currency 
depreciation in the early 1990s, to an extent, could have been an indirect cause of the 
East Asian crisis. For a nascent economy, the global reverberations that it caused as it 
devalued its currency would, demonstrate the importance of the role that it might 
come to play in the global financial markets. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Was China the First Domino? John Ferland, Hali Edison and Prakash Loungani, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 604, March 1998 
10 See footnote 9  
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RMB’s role during the Crisis 
Regardless of the various literature and opinions that could be put forth to dispute 
China’s role in causing the Asian financial crisis, what cannot be disputed is the role 
the Chinese currency (and by extension the Chinese government) played in 
maintaining financial stability in Asia during the crisis. The subsequent credit crunch 
arising from a round of devaluations would have further hobbled the affected East 
Asian economies. Thus it is safe to say that when Vice-Minister Long Yongtu 
announced,
11 “If China devalues, that would set off a new cycle of devaluations and 
that would be disastrous. Therefore I have been authorized to tell you: China will not 
devalue”, the financial markets took note of the RMB’s new role as one of Asia’s 
most important currencies.  
 
Lessons Learnt 
Based on the experiences of the countries involved in the East Asian crisis in 1997, 
several lessons can be learnt
12: 
1.  Interaction between highly global capital markets and poorly supervised 
financial systems can lead to financial disaster. ‘Hot money’ flowed in quickly, 
leading to a lending boom and inflating asset prices. The subsequent speed 
capital outflow burst the asset bubble. 
2.  Crony capitalism led to morally hazardous lending by banks 
3.  A diversified financial market is necessary, as more than 80% of financing in 
the affected countries were bank lending 
4.  Interest rate controls are incompatible with a market driven corporate sector 
5.  Effective and developed insolvency procedures were important  
6.  Asset management companies were important in restructuring non-performing 
assets 
7.  Judicial system has to be developed enough to effectively enforce liquidation 
8.  Financial sector restructuring had a significant impact on fiscal accounts 
 
                                                 
11 Long Yongtu, China’s Vice minister of Trade Development and Economic Cooperation said this at 
the Asia Pacific Economic and Security Conference held in January 1998 in Honolulu Hawaii 
12 Financial Reforms in Asia since 1997: Lessons and Responses, Ashok K. Lahiri, Ministry of 
Finance, Government of India, 2004  
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Based on these lessons, the Chinese government took active steps to prevent such a 
crisis from happening
13.  Special bonds were issued to increase capitalisation of state 
banks, and a new banking supervision body, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission was set up which focused on both regulatory compliance and risk 
management. Efforts were made to dispose of state banks non-performing loans, with 
a new rating system, the CAMEL system, put in place alongside other prudential 
regulation. Corporate governance supervision was enforced and a risk assessment 
system and early warning mechanism were set up. Aside from strengthening the 
financial system, the Chinese government also strengthened the legal framework to 
ensure there was legal support for the reforms with important financial legislation
14. 
One important point to note as well was that China was fairly insulated from the East 
Asian crisis due to the fact that it maintained capital controls on its economy. This 
meant that the speculative hot money that inflated asset prices would not affect 
China’s economy as seriously as it affected its neighbours. Although achieving 
currency convertibility has been a stated aim of the Chinese government, the Asian 
financial crisis disrupted this process.  
 
The Current debate on Revaluation 
In light of the experiences gained from the crisis, we shall now consider the role of 
the Chinese economy and its currency in the current debate on the revaluation of the 
RMB. The notion that the RMB was undervalued began in 2002, when at a time of 
slowing growth in the United States, China’s rapid economic growth and increasing 
trade surplus with the US became more apparent.  Calls that an undervalued Chinese 
currency lead to a trade imbalance and was causing the United States to lose 
manufacturing jobs from business leaders gained growing support from the American 
political elite. There was mounting pressure from Washington that China revalues its 
currency or allow it to float freely. Various arguments were advanced, including 
testimony to a House of Representatives committee by a US businessman, Jay Bender, 
                                                 
13 The Lessons Learnt from the Development and Reform of China’s Banking Sector, Liu Shiyu, Wu 
Yi and Liu Zhengming BIS Papers no 28 part9. 2006 
14 These legislation consist of; the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of 
China, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks, the Securities Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, the Accounting Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Guarantee 
Law of China and the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China.  
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who cited the Big Mac index
15 as evidence that China’s currency was undervalued. 
Burger prices aside, we shall consider the academic arguments about China’s 
currency valuation. The two main arguments for the RMB being undervalued are 
framed in two approaches
16, the underlying balance approach and the global payments 
approach.  
 
Underlying Balance Approach 
In the underlying balance approach, the optimal value for a currency is calculated as 
the rate where there would be equilibrium in a country’s balance of payments. By 
averaging capital account balance from the years 1992 to 2002, ‘normal’ net capital 
flows were determined to be around 1.5% of GDP, this would indicate that a 
corresponding current account deficit of 1.5% of GDP would be needed for 
equilibrium. In reality however, the overall current account surpluses for the 2003-
2004 period were estimated at 4.5 to 5% of GDP, this would mean that China needs a 
current account deterioration of 6.5 – 8.5% to restore balance of payments equilibrium. 
Based on this and several other trade assumptions the conclusion was that the RMB 
was undervalued by about 20 to 40%.  
 
Global Payments Approach 
In the global payments approach, global payments imbalances are considered and 
these are used to determine the role (or rather, the exchange rate) the Chinese 
currency can adopt to correct these imbalances. Of course this argument focuses more 
on the US trade deficit, currently at more than 7% GDP and the real, trade weighted 
depreciation it must experience to correct these imbalances. While the main market 
determined exchange rates
17 have been appreciating against the US dollar over the 
past four to five years, Asian currencies, which account for 40% of the US trade 
weighted dollar index have either appreciated slightly or depreciated against the US 
dollar. Considering the assertion that a trade weighted depreciation of 15-25% of the 
dollar is needed to correct the US’s external imbalance whilst maintaining sustainable 
global growth, the Chinese government could actively seek to rectify this. Just as 
                                                 
15 The Big Mac index is a global comparison of Big Mac prices in an extremely simple and rough 
guide to determine currency valuations. 
16 Renminbi Controversies, Morris Goldstein, Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow, Institute for 
International Economics, Nov 2003, revised Dec 2005 
17 Among these are; the Euro, the Canadian dollar, the British Pound and the Australian dollar  
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China held off a round of currency depreciations during the East Asian crisis by not 
depreciating, it seems that China could take the lead in correcting the imbalance by 
appreciating the RMB, which would likely induce appreciation in other Asian 
currencies as well. 
 
Will revaluation make a difference? 
At the beginning of the debate on revaluation in 2003, the International Monetary 
Fund concluded that “most Directors noted that there is no clear evidence that the 
RMB is substantially undervalued at this juncture.”
18 Whether or not the RMB was 
undervalued, it has been suggested that a revaluation of the RMB will not truly restore 
the trade imbalance anyway
19. China’s trade with the US is highly dependent on the 
triangular trading pattern it shares with the US and other East Asian economies. China 
imports intermediate components from its neighbours, assembles them and exports 
them to the United States. Its ‘value add’ in the supply chain is assembly due to its 
comparative advantage of cheap labour. It is important to note that 55% of China’s 
exports are in the form of processed trade, which are dominated by foreign multi-
nationals and while a RMB appreciation would make Chinese exports expensive, it 
would also make its import relatively cheaper. Since exporters of processed trade 
would offset their lower selling prices with lower costs of components, then an 
appreciation would not make a significant difference in that portion of trade. Global 
supply chains could also be significantly disrupted in the event of an appreciation, 
since most of China’s export led growth has been driven by foreign multinationals. In 
fact nearly two thirds of China’s foreign driven export dynamic since 1994 can be 
traced to them. 
 
Furthermore Chinese export competitiveness is not just determined by exchange rate 
alone. China maintains a value added export rebate tax that gives manufacturers 
further incentive to export. This tax was a response by the Chinese to placate local 
exporters in 1998 during the Asian financial crisis as compensation for not devaluing 
and the abolition of this tax would be a better step to addressing the trade imbalance 
rather than a revaluation. Another element of China’s trade competitiveness lies in its 
huge reserves of labour. Although technological content in Chinese exports has been 
                                                 
18 2003 Article IV Consultation with the People's Republic of China, International Monetary Fund 
19 See footnote 1  
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increasing over the past few years, this has not been followed with a corresponding 
increase in labour costs. In fact wages for export-oriented labour have remained 
stagnant for the past 10 years, this is somewhat a reflection of the huge reserves of 
labour China has in its rural agricultural sector. China’s FDI regime is also one of the 
driving factors of its export competitiveness. It is the largest recipient of FDI in the 
world, with nearly 60% of its inflows coming from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The 
majority of firms that invest in China are driven by fiscal incentives and the cheap 
labour available. With income tax rates levied at 15% in Chinese ‘economic zones’, 
an income tax exemption for the first 2 years and halved for the next 3 and further 
concessions involving land, energy, labour and raw materials that favour foreign firms, 
the fiscal subsidies in place will definitely absorb any effects on competition that an 
appreciation would have. 
 
Negative Effects of Appreciation 
Opponents of a devaluation of the RMB also note the negative global consequences 
that would be brought about should it be devalued, these views were put forward by 
Robert Mundell, ‘father of the Euro’, and Stephen Roach, chief economist at Morgan 
Stanley, who indicated that an appreciation or floating of the RMB would have 
important consequences for growth and stability in China and its knock-on effects on 
the rest of Asia. Due to China’s current lack of sound financial and banking systems 
and the inherent structural problems China faces, a significant appreciation of the 
RMB by 40 percent, as some suggest it is undervalued by, would lead to economic 
growth of 5 percent or lower. This would have enormous consequences on China’s 
banking sector, due to its high amount of non-performing loans and would most likely 
lead to increasing deflationary pressure on an economy just emerging from deflation. 
The Chinese consumer’s tendency to save, due to a lack of a state-supported social 
structure, would also increase and with investment and consumption now standing at 
more than 40% of GDP there would be a further economic contraction. Asset bubbles 
would most likely arise as well; foreign direct investment would drop, as investors 
flock to lower cost competitors such as Vietnam and the subsequent effect of this 
would be a weak RMB and depreciation. Furthermore, Alan Greenspan, former Fed 
Chairman concluded, “a misaligned Chinese currency...could have adverse effects on  
12 
 
the global financial market and hence indirectly on U.S. output and jobs”
20 and his 
views were echoed by Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan’s former vice-finance minister and 
once known as “Mr Yen”, who argued that a floating RMB may lead to a disastrous 
result in Asia and even in the world.
21 
 
Thus it is easy to see the current debate on China’s currency valuation and its effect 
on global trade imbalances is a distraction from the root causes of this imbalance. 
China’s comparative advantage of cheap labour allows it a stronger hand when 
dealing with its trading partners and the various fiscal policies implemented by its 
government makes its exports much more competitive than any benefits an 
undervalued currency would confer. What is more important to note is the impacts of 
a sharp appreciation in the RMB will have dire consequences on the world economy, 
this would demonstrate the effect the Chinese currency has on global financial market, 
it is also relevant to note that there has never been as much focus and debate on the 
currency of an emerging economy as this, nor have there ever been calls for an 
emerging economy to appreciate its currency as opposed to devaluing it. 
 
Beijing’s Response  
With the continued calls for revaluation however, Beijing responded on 21
 July 2005 
by appreciating the RMB by 2% against the US dollar and stating that the 
management of the RMB would be based on a basket of currencies. By widening the 
trading bands of the RMB as well the Chinese government aimed to bring a market 
realistic valuation of the RMB. Although the initial response was not a significant 
appreciation in the value of the RMB, it should be noted that the RMB has moved 
slowly but surely from 8.20 RMB to the USD, to 7.86 RMB to the USD in the past 15 
months. This ‘wait and see’ attitude to appreciation is a reflection of Beijing’s 
prudential financial management with regards to its own economy. China understands 
that with its capital controls in place any liberalisation of its exchange rate policies 
must be in tandem with relaxation of its capital controls. Moving the Chinese 
currency to total convertibility was a stated aim of the Chinese government on its 
accession into the WTO and the full political support for achieving this was 
                                                 
20 Fuquay, Jim. Fed Chairman Warns Against Forcing China to Boost Value of Its Currency. Knight 
Ridder Tribune Business News, Washington, D.C., Dec 12, 2003. 
21 See footnote 4  
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demonstrated in a resolution
22 passed on 21 October 2003 by the powerful Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It stated that “Provided that risks can be 
effectively guarded off, we should selectively, and in steps, deregulate restrictions on 
cross-border capital transactions and gradually establish RMB’s convertibility on the 
capital account.” However, it is important to note that China’s definition of a 
convertible currency means fundamental convertibility whereby the RMB is fully 
convertible on the current account and long term capital account transactions are 
allowed but short term capital flows, which are usually speculative, are not. This 
would most probably be based on lessons learnt from the Asian financial crisis and 
again demonstrates Beijing’s attempts at prudential management.  
 
Capital controls in China 
The current framework of capital controls in China is based on three pillars
23; these 
encompass controls on: 
•  Foreign debt  
•  Foreign direct investment  
•  International portfolio investment  
 
Controls on foreign debt include planning permission and registration for all forms of 
debt including government liabilities, international loans and project financing. 
External collateral and risk management with regard to these loans are also subject to 
central government restrictions. The next pillar of capital controls, control on foreign 
direct investment has been one where China has been particularly successful. Even 
with controls on investment capital, operational expenditure, foreign currency receipts 
and external borrowings, China has been very successful at attracting inward FDI. In 
recent years though, the focus has shifted from capital inflows to capital outflows in 
the form of outward FDI from Chinese companies. Since private Chinese residents are 
prevented from buying foreign securities, controls on portfolio investment focus 
exclusively on overseas issuance of Chinese government bonds and shares of Chinese 
firms listed on overseas exchanges, B shares, which Chinese citizens are prohibited 
from buying. 
                                                 
22 People’s Daily, 22 October 2003.  
23 Capital Controls in China: Recent Developments and Reform Prospects, Zhichao Zhang, Durham 




In recent years, as China has moved toward increased flexibility in its exchange rate 
mechanism, it has gradually begun to relax capital controls as well, in an effort to 
reach its stated aim of fundamental convertibility of the RMB. Specific focus has been 
given to promoting two way capital flows, not only is foreign capital free to flow 
across China’s borders but the use of the RMB in foreign markets will be actively 
promoted. This is illustrated in various examples, such as the active promotion of 
outward FDI, seen in the higher international profiles of Chinese companies and the 
increasing involvement of Chinese companies in Africa. Private allowances for 
currency outflows by Chinese residents have been increased as well, with the limit 
being raised from 6,000 RMB to 30,000 RMB. The biggest step to capital account 
liberalisation so far was taken on 13
 March 2003, with the government formally 
giving permission for the RMB to be used in foreign trade. With increasing Chinese 
demand on global energy and commodity markets as well as increased global trading 
links, this will eventually lead to the RMB being a vehicle currency for international 
settlement and trade. This would also lead to more multinational corporations holding 
RMB balances in their accounts. 
 
A comparison with Japan  
Perhaps the best way to evaluate China’s effects on global financial markets is to 
draw parallels with Japan’s gradual relaxation of capital controls and its subsequent 
effects on global financial markets. The Japanese economy in the 1960s and 1970s to 
an extent mirrors China’s emergence today
24. Both have (or had) high economic 
growth, large amounts of currency reserves, surpluses in the balance of payments and 
increasing upward pressure on their currencies. In addition both nations adopted 
similar exchange rate mechanisms and capital controls to manage their currencies. 
These included prohibition of capital outflows, encouragement of capital inflows and 
capital management in the economy through banking institutions. 
 
Japan used a policy of gradualism when it came to liberalising its capital account; the 
entire initial process took 20 years from the implementation of its basic Plan for 
                                                 
24 Sequencing of Capital Account Liberalization: Japan's experiences and their implications to China, 
Kenji Aramaki Professor, School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, Public Policy 
Review, 2006, Vol.2, No.1  
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Liberalisation of Trade and Foreign Exchange in the 1960s to when a revised and 
much more liberalised Foreign Exchange Law was implemented in the 1980s. 
Complete currency liberalisation was achieved in the late 1990s with the liberalisation 
of the foreign exchange business. During the initial period of capital account 
liberalisation in the 1960s, Japan started out as a net debtor nation with small net 
capital inflows. However as capital account liberalisation took effect, Japan became a 
net creditor and based on its balance of payment data, long term capital account 
outflows ranged from US$1 billion to US $12 billion from the mid 1960s to the 1970s. 
Although this capital flow was disrupted during the oil crisis in the late 1970s, capital 
outflow in the 1980s began with renewed vigour as Japanese companies invested 
overseas to secure energy resources worldwide as well as assets in the United States.
25 
China now seems to be experiencing similar patterns of capital outflow as well. The 
recent debate on CNOOC’s
26 bid for Unocal, a US oil firm, as well as China’s 
increased FDI today in Africa in an attempt to secure energy and mineral resources 
are all indicators that China seeks to gain increased recognition in the global economy 
and a to facilitate that, convertible currency is required. 
 
All in all, the Japanese experience with capital account liberalisation and the shift to 
full currency convertibility took nearly 40 years. Assuming this as an appropriate 
gradual time frame, one could conclude that China will see its foreign exchange 
mechanism approaching fundamental convertibility during the decade of 2010-2020, 
considering it only opened its economy to global market forces in the late 1970s/early 
1980s period.  Several factors also need consideration when drawing similarities 
between Japan and China’s economic expansion and exchange rate liberalisation. 
Firstly there is a general acceptance of liberalisation worldwide, in contrast, when 
Japan chose to move toward liberalisation in the 1960s, many developed economies 
still maintained foreign exchange restrictions and capital controls. Thus pressure on 
China today to liberalise is considerably more than it was on Japan in the past. 
However this pressure is balanced by the lessons learnt from the Asian financial crisis, 
which demonstrated that uncontrolled capital account liberalisation coupled with 
                                                 
25 This is reflected in high profile real estate purchases, such as the Rockefeller Centre in New York by 
Japanese investors and the various attempts by the Japanese to invest in Hollywood movie studios 
26 CNOOC is a Chinese state owned oil company, in August 2003 it bid US$18.5 billion to buy Unocal 
an American oil company, this bid was rejected due to political pressure from Washington and is a 
reflection of tensions over U.S. economic dominance and Chinese ascendancy.  
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greater international capital flow today could lead to highly volatile capital flows and 
would severely penalise economies that were not ready.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to define the role of the Chinese currency in the global financial 
markets, having explored the past of the RMB and the implications of various 
decisions taken by the Chinese government with regard to its currency; we can come 
to several conclusions on Chinese exchange rate policy 
1.  The Chinese government favours prudential financial management, it has 
demonstrated a willingness to succumb to international pressure, but only on 
its terms, with the Chinese economy as its priority 
2.  The Asian financial crisis exposed weaknesses in neighbouring economies and 
lessons learnt from that episode seem to have been implemented, special focus 
is placed on capital account liberalisation as well as NPL assets of state banks. 
3.  Currency flexibility and convertibility must be coordinated in tandem with 
capital account liberalisation. This is a stated aim of the Chinese government 
and so far Beijing has been moving slowly but surely in this direction. 
4.  China’s economic emergence today has many similarities with Japan in the 
1960s and 1970s, thus Japan’s experience of liberalisation will serve China 
well. 
 
With these conclusions in mind, it then left to answer the most important question of 
all when considering what role will the RMB play in the global financial markets in 
the future, Will it ever become a reserve currency? 
 
Reserve currency status is the pinnacle in any nation’s economic development; it 
indicates that the nation’s economy has reached a state where its currency is 
considered resilient enough to be held in reserve. It is also a good indicator of trade 
patterns since major trading partners are more likely to hold reserves of their 
counterparties. Since the United States ranks as the major trading partner of most 
nations in the world today, it is no accident that the US dollar is the main reserve  
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currency of most central banks. To be eligible for reserve status, several prerequisites 
have to be fulfilled
27: 
•  The currency should be fully convertible and widely accepted  
•  Its financial markets should be broad and liquid 
•  Its value should be reasonably stable 
•  Large amounts of trade should be transacted in it 
 
Of course the first stumbling block to this is the fact that the RMB is not fully 
convertible, but since Beijing has already stated it intends to have a convertible 
currency and assuming there are no deviations from its exchange rate policy
28, this is 
a question worth pondering. Since the Asian crisis, we see that China has taken active 
steps to reform its banking system and to deal with the high rates of non-performing 
loans within its banking industry. Strengthened legal frameworks in terms of judicial 
reforms and improved financial legislation have also helped investors gain confidence 
in its financial markets and given Beijing’s penchant for slow and steady reform and 
liberalisation, it will be only a matter of time until the Chinese financial markets 
become fully mature and increasingly liquid. In terms of the value of the RMB, not 
much evidence has been presented so far on its stability in value. Regardless of the 
current debate on currency valuation, which is focused more on trade issues, the 
upward pressure that the RMB faces today is more due to a decline in the value of the 
US dollar than anything else. Suffice to say China has not undergone any external 
shocks to its financial system, thus it is hard to empirically gauge its stability of value. 
However based on qualitative analyses of policy decisions, reform initiatives and 
financial management by the Bank of China and the Chinese government, we can 
conclude that the RMB should be able to maintain stability of its value in the long run. 
Furthermore with formal permission being granted in 13
th March 2003 for the RMB to 
be used in foreign trade and China’s increasing purchasing power on the international 
commodities and energy markets, the use of the RMB as a currency of settlement for 
major trade purchases will only be a matter of time. Other points supporting this 
                                                 
27 What makes a reserve currency, Rob Kirby, Financial Sense Online 20/3/2006 
28 After the July 21
st 2005 appreciation, it has been argued that China will attempt to mimic 
Singapore’s foreign exchange regime, which is based on exchange rate management as a monetary 
policy instrument. Although China has openly envied Singapore’s political model (both have 
authoritarian one-party rule), the contention that China will copy Singapore’s foreign exchange regime 
was rebutted in ‘Is Singapore the Model for China’s New Exchange Rate Policy?‘ Bennett T. 
McCallum, Carnegie Mellon University, November 2005  
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argument include the current slide of the US dollar and increasing debate on whether 
it can maintain its primacy as a petro-currency
29, China’s increasing presence in 
Africa to secure energy resources as well as increasing diplomatic ties and relations
30, 
its increasingly central role in the East Asian- American trade triangle and its 
continued high rate of economic growth. However it is important to take note of 
several factors that could adversely affect economic growth and with that the strength 
of the RMB, among them are the recent debate on human rights vs. economic growth 
that has gained media attention lately, its rapidly overheating economy, its 
authoritarian political system, the effective resolution of the NPL problem and the 
demographic time-bomb planted with Beijing’s official one-child policy. 
 
To end, although it is unlikely the RMB will be the primary reserve currency of the 
world’s central banks,
31 we can say that assuming China proceeds along a 
liberalisation timetable similar to Japan, and based on the above arguments regarding 
the prerequisites for reserve status, China’s role in the global financial markets will be 
as a major reserve currency, overtaking the Japanese Yen and the British Pound as the 
third most held currency, due to its potential trade dominance of Asian and Africa, by 
the early 2020s.  
                                                 
29 Petro Euro: A reality or distant nightmare for the U.S.? 30 Apr 2006, www.aljazeera.com 
30 Summit shows China’s Africa clout 6 Nov 2006, www.BBC.co.uk 
31 Historically, status as the world’s primary currency is reserved for not only the world’s pre-eminent 
economy, but also the one with a military system that can protect its economy. This is reflected in 
Greek and Roman civilisations, and more recently the British Empire and the American ‘empire’. 
Although China has extended the reach of its military capability in the form of bases to protect its 
energy assets in Africa, it is highly unlikely that it will ever succeed the United States in terms of 
military strength 